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I
n June, the Supreme Court overruled a majority decision
of the Court of Appeal confirming the findings in the
High Court and reinstating the judgment of the Refugee
Status Appeals Authority (Attorney-General v X [2008] 2
NZLR 579). It held that s 129T of the Immigration Act 1987
attaches confidentiality to information used in the determi-
nation of refugee status with limited disclosure permitted
when investigating the possibility of criminal prosecution
under the International Crimes and International Criminal
Court Act 2000 (ICC Act) or potential extradition for those
alleged criminal acts or omissions. The author concedes the
decision of the Supreme Court is doctrinally sound. This
article argues that where the Court is open to criticism is in
the failure to acknowledge its own guidance in Attorney-
General v Zaoui [2005] 1 NZLR 577 relating to determina-
tionswith thepotential to result in deportationof an individual,
or, in this case, extradition. Section 129T will tolerate disclo-
sure only where the consequences do not undermine the
statutorily imposed, and judicially acknowledged (Zaoui
(SC), paras [90], [91]), imperative to “affirm, protect, and
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New
Zealand; and to affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), Preamble).
HISTORY OF THE APPEAL
X brought an unsuccessful appeal to the Refugee Status
Appeals Authority against a decision declining refugee sta-
tus; the grounds for which are unknown and not relevant to
issues on which the contentious appeal arose. The Appeals
Authority, at the same time, declined applications for confi-
dentiality to attach to evidence used during the status deter-
mination, and for an adjournment pending resolution of
proceedings for extradition to Rwanda or criminal proceed-
ings in New Zealand founded on the alleged actions.
On an application for judicial review, the High Court
granted declaratory relief, holding that s 129T and the Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees afforded absolute
confidentiality of all evidence in an appeal to the Authority.
Any disclosure under s 129T(3) was solely to be used to
determine a claim for refugee status ([2006] NZAR 533).
Subsidiary purposes, including extradition or criminal pros-
ecution in Rwanda or New Zealand, are excluded.
In the Court of Appeal the majority held that while
“closely balanced”, this interpretation of s 129T was correct
([2007] NZCA 388). Disclosure under s 129T(3)(b) was
restricted to functions “incidental to or consequential upon”
determination of refugee claims, prohibiting disclosure to
public servants working on extradition or prosecution. Dis-
senting, Ellen France J held “there is nothing on a reading of
s 129T to warrant imposition of a limitation to prevent
disclosure to those in the extradition or prosecution areas”
and that there was nothing “in the Convention or in state
practice thatwarrants reading the section in theway favoured
by the majority”. The Attorney-General obtained leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court.
THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court was required to determine “whether
s 129T(3)(b)… permits those who are subject to a duty of
confidence … to disclose matters that are confidential … for
the purpose of the possible extradition of the first respondent
to Rwanda or for the possible prosecution of the first respon-
dent in NewZealand?” (para [1]) Disagreeing with the lower
courts, it concluded that s 129T does not “restrict disclosure
to officials engaged in the determination of refugee status”
and permits disclosure “to other officials for the purposes of
extradition or prosecution” (paras [7] and [16]).
In finding that
s 129T, properly construed, permits information about
the application … for refugee status to be disclosed to
officials who require that information to consider his
possible extradition for a crime of a type described in
art 1F(a) or prosecution under the ICC Act (para [16])
the Court relied on:
• a plain meaning interpretation of s 129T (para [8]);
• the statutory context which established that limiting
disclosure to “those engaged in an official capacity in
determining refugee status” would undermine parlia-
mentary intent (para [9]);
• the primary rationale of s 129T to protect individuals
from serious risk to safety did not limit disclosure on
the facts (para [10]); and
• the proposition that in the circumstances the appli-
cable instruments under international legal framework
did not give rise to a presumption against disclosure
(para [15]).
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
X conceded that the earlier High Court interpretation was
not consistent with either the Refugee Convention or state
practice (para [15]). Article 1F of the Convention displaces
protection in favour of “any person with respect to whom
there are serious reasons for considering that … he has
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity” discounting any obligation on the state to
maintain confidentiality. The obligation on states to extra-
dite or prosecute provided further justification for the court
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to construe s 129T in favour of maintaining art 1F and
although it missed the opportunity to invoke the Vienna
Convention, to which New Zealand is party, the Court’s
interpretation would have satisfied the good faith principle
found therein (art 31).
Explicit reference to state obligations under the interna-
tional framework is compatible with the Court’s earlier
approach in Zaoui. In accordance with its consideration of
the specific and generally applicable international responsi-
bilities, the Supreme Court was likewise required in A-G v X
to expand its analysis beyond the Refugee Convention. The
Refugee Convention is of limited application when the appli-
cant was not granted refugee status.
Serious reasons for considering …
The Court believed that “the Authority acted correctly in
attempting to resolve the application of X for refugee status
prior to the resolution of any question of extradition or
prosecution” (para [17]). This investigation led the Author-
ity to decline refugee status so that at the time of the appeal to
the Supreme Court X was designated a “without status”
asylum seeker. The deficit in protection for asylum seekers
that do not satisfy the definitional threshold of the Conven-
tion is well known and not canvassed here; except to note
that the resulting framework of protection available to such
individuals equates to the state’s domestic assumption of
obligations under general principles of international, prima-
rily human rights, law.
The Supreme Court expressed concern that “the ability of
this country to give effect to art 1F(a) [of the Refugee
Convention] would be prejudiced if s 129T(3)(b) were inter-
preted so as to exclude disclosure to officers and employees
considering extradition or prosecution” (para [16]), yet in
light of the non-applicability of the Convention given the
non-attribution of refugee status, this was not a priority for
the Court at this time. Before review of the broader frame-
work of relevant international obligations, consideration of
state obligations under the Refugee Convention where an
individual was granted refugee status and seeks to rely upon
s 129T is appropriate.
Refoulement is possible under the Conventionwhen “seri-
ous reasons” exist to show the individual committed one of
the crimes listed. In the current circumstances, disclosure was
sought for information relating to “possible extradition or
prosecution [a]s sought for war crimes” (Media Release: 20
June 2008). Section 25(c) of NZBORA provides that “every-
one who is charged with an offence has … the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”.
Without evidence to the contrary the person is presumed
innocent. Establishing “serious reasons” places a heavy bur-
den on the party alleging the crimes (in this case the state) to
provide evidence, without the assistance of an unwilling
suspect who is equally protected from self-incrimination.
The “primary rationale” for s 129T is to protect from a
serious risk to safety (para [10]). It should not be a tool to
dislodge the state’s obligation to protect the individual given
the potential for harm if extradited to Rwanda. To permit
this would render the primary rationale of s 129T farcical.
Substantial grounds
While the Refugee Convention is only partially relevant in
the overall discussion, its articulation in art 33 of the prohi-
bition on refoulement in light of serious risk to individuals is
relevant. Although the Supreme Court doubted its peremp-
tory status in Zaoui, many commentators consider the pro-
hibition on refoulement to be a jus cogens, or at the least
customary, norm of international law prohibiting the return
of individuals to a state in which they face serious risk of
harm. Provision in instruments such as theConvention against
Torture and European Convention of Human Rights extends
its applicability to all asylum seekers.
InZaoui the Court referred to international protections in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and jurisprudence including Soering v UK ((1989)
11 EHRR 439 (ECHR), paras [90], [91]) to hold that,
independently of the discretion under art 1F of the Refugee
Convention, where “there are substantial grounds for believ-
ing that, as a result of the deportation, the personwould be in
danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or of being sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment” return couldnot be ordered (Zaoui, para [93]).
The state is “obliged to act in conformitywithNewZealand’s
obligations under arts 6(1) and 7 of the ICCPR and art 3 of
the Convention against Torture” (Zaoui, para [76]), which
cumulatively require the protection of all individuals under
its control, regardless of their refugee status.
The question the Supreme Court should have considered
was whether the serious reasons that justified disclosure for
the purpose of satisfying New Zealand’s obligation to pros-
ecute or extradite gave rise to substantial grounds that the
individual would be at risk of harm. If we presume that New
Zealand would uphold its domestic and international under-
takings to maintain the individual’s human rights if pros-
ecuted pursuant to the ICC Act, the remaining consideration
is whether the same protection is assured following extradi-
tion to Rwanda.
PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION?
As the international ad hoc Tribunal for Rwanda comes to a
close, the need to transfer suspects to alternative jurisdictions
for trial is contemplated (UN Doc S/2006/358 21). The UK,
Netherlands, France and Canada have all initiated proceed-
ings against alleged génocidaires resident in their countries.
In this case, the closure of the Tribunal excludes the UN
Court as an option. Given that it is not the Tribunal seeking
extradition, the assumption is that the individual is alleged to
be a low-level perpetrator, and therefore not to be tried by an
international court. If NewZealand is unwilling to prosecute
the person it must determine whether extradition to Rwanda
is in accordance with the international imperative to extra-
dite or prosecute (Amnesty International Report AFR47/013/
2007 (AI Report 07)) and with New Zealand’s obligations to
the person.
No extradition treaty exists between New Zealand and
Rwanda and the requests made by the Rwandan government
rely on sovereign reciprocity and respect between nations,
rather than a legal obligation (AI Report 07). Even where a
treaty relationship underlies a request for extradition, inter-
national law recognises that fulfilment is subject to the
maintenance of fundamental human rights protections. In
Soering v UK the European Court of HumanRights held that
it would be a violation of art 3 of the European Convention
to extradite a person to the US in a capital punishment case,
owing to the harsh conditions on death row and the uncer-
tain timescale within which the sentence would be executed.
The Court considered parties to the European Convention
may not extradite persons where a significant risk of torture
or inhumane treatment exists. Soering was referred to by the
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Supreme Court as it confirmed the Crown “is obliged to act
in conformitywithNewZealand’s obligations under arts 6(1)
and 7 of the ICCPR and art 3 of the Convention against
Torture” (Zaoui, para [76]). It considered the combined
weight of ss 8 and 9 of the NZBORA and the guarantees
afforded under theConvention against Torture and the ICCPR
do not permit deportationwhere a risk of inhuman treatment
exists (Zaoui, paras [90], [91]).
Rwanda has ratified neither the Torture Convention nor
its Optional Protocol and only abolished the death penalty in
2007. Amnesty International has expressed concern as to
potential risks faced by individuals on extradition back to
Rwanda. It considers:
suspects must not be transferred to Rwandan courts for
trial until it is demonstrated that trials will comply with
international standards of justice … national courts of
states that have been requested to extradite persons to
Rwanda should immediately start national proceedings
exercising universal jurisdiction … or extradite these per-
sons to states able and willing to do so in fair trials
without the death penalty, torture or ill-treatment or other
human rights violations (AI Report 07).
Reports of torture have come to the attention of human
rights organisations (eg Human Rights Watch: “Rwanda:
Hundreds Illegally Detained in Former Warehouse” 14 May
2006), and courts in other jurisdictions (United States v
Karake (US District Court, DC District) Crim No 02-0256
(ESH) (2006) p 149)). A 2006 US State Department Report
expressed concern at reports of widespread torture for inter-
rogation purposes. Unless satisfied the weight of this evi-
dence does not amount to “substantial grounds” establishing
a risk of torture or inhuman treatment, the New Zealand
government cannot condone extradition.
The Supreme Court was persuaded in Zaoui that “the
right to natural justice affirmed in s 27 of the NZBORA and
found in provisions of the ICCPR and elsewhere would
provide procedural protection” (Zaoui, para [92]). The sec-
ond limb of inquiry thus required before sanctioning extra-
dition is whether transfer of X and trial in the Rwandan
courts has the potential to breach the right to justice and
specifically ss 23 and 25 of the NZBORA, as the domestic
incorporation of those protections found within the ICCPR.
Section 23 provides that persons being detained must be
treated with “humanity and with respect for the inherent
dignity of the person” by ensuring rights associated with
detention are ensured, while s 25 establishes the minimum
standards in criminal procedure being “the right to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial court”. To
give effect to the rights encompassed by ss 23 and 25 the
court requires assurance that criticisms levelled internation-
ally at the Rwandan justice system do not give rise to concern
of a risk to the prisoner if extradited.
The Rwandan justice system adopts a tiered approach
involving both formal trials and gacaca grass roots courts.
Issues associated with community justice do not require
consideration here, for if the Rwandan government consid-
ers the alleged actions of X justify an extradition request then
the allegations are unlikely to be those levelled at loosely
organised militia groups. This does not pre-empt the need to
address doubts raised as to the fairness of the formalised
Rwandan court structure.
The media release that accompanied the judgment of the
SupremeCourt referred to investigation of allegations against
X for “war crimes”. Significant overlap exists between crimes
against humanity and war crimes. The distinguishing feature
is that war crimes are committed in the context of armed
conflict. The implication in a formal request by the Rwandan
government for assistance; the reference to war crimes rather
than crimes against humanity or criminal charges generally;
and the international pursuit of X despite the number of
prisoners still awaiting trial in Rwanda cumulatively sug-
gests extradition is sought for crimes allegedly perpetrated as
a soldier during the 1994 genocide.
Article 138 of Rwandan Organic Law No 14/2006 OF
22/03/2006 designates it is “theMilitary Tribunal [that] tries
in the first instance all offences committed by all Military
personnel irrespective of their rank”. The deportee is there-
fore likely to be brought before a Military Tribunal whose
processes it will be even harder for the New Zealand govern-
ment to be assured will amount to a fair trial, given the
insular nature of military tribunals. The inherent lack of
transparency associated with military tribunals is exacer-
bated in the Rwandan context given that questions linger as
to impartiality due to the failure to bring any member of the
ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) party to trial for
alleged atrocities during the genocide.
Speculation arises as to what formal charges Xwould face
before a military tribunal. While the inference drawn above
is that extradition is for war crimes, the definitional strictures
of such a charge remains unclear. Rwanda is not party to the
Rome Statute for the ICC so is not bound to substantively
adopt the expression of the crimes therein. Furthermore
reference cannot be had to the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as it does not specifi-
cally include war crimes. Without clarification of the crimi-
nal charges likely to be faced it is difficult to determine
whether the evidence against X establishes a prima facie case,
let alone a “serious” one.
Finally, there is the potential for detention conditions in
Rwanda to amount to a breach of s 23 of the NZBORA.
Firstly, the failure to bring many inmates to trial for alleged
crimes arising from the genocide 14 years ago gives rise to a
significant concern as to delay. The imperative in maintain-
ing procedural safeguards is not one the Rwandan govern-
ment appears to prioritise; as is apparent by its early refusal
to cooperate with the ICTR where findings of an unaccept-
able delay led to charges against a defendant being dismissed
(and reinstated on appeal). Secondly, recent investigation
into detention conditions by Amnesty International reported
incidents of excessive violence and torture toward prisoners
extradited back to Rwanda, as well as cramped and over-
crowded prisons (AI Report 07).
Should “serious reasons” exist for believing that an indi-
vidual committed crimes giving rise to an imperative of
prosecute or extradite, a balance must be drawn where
“substantial grounds” for suggesting extraditionwould result
in a breach of those rights of the individual, states are obliged
to protect under international law. Any interpretation of the
confidentiality protection under s 129T cannot allow disclo-
sure, the consequence of, which leads to extradition to a state
where the asylum seeker would be subject to treatment that
would undermine New Zealand’s arguably more onerous
international obligations to protect fundamental human rights
incorporated under the NZBORA and recognised by the
Courts in Zaoui as paramount. The Supreme Court must be
careful to follow its own findings. r
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